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. . under present conditions, ad hoc member state coalitions offer the most effective deterrent to aggression or to the escalation or the spread of the ongoing conflict." 2 Consequently, Africa's regional organizations have taken it upon themselves to address the prevailing security threats in their regions, despite their limited resources.
These regional organizations have tried to quell these conflicts. However, the need to build stable governments in the affected countries still remains a concern. The international community must assist in preventing violent conflicts; it must also engage in building lasting peace. Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs that promote civilian control of the military are a good start in this critical process. SSR programs promote sound security policies, plans, and activities that strengthen civilian control and oversight of the security forces in order to improve these states' development of justice, safety, and security. SSR promotes good governance, sustainable economic development, and social well-being by providing basic human needs. Reforming civilmilitary relations is the key to building regional stability.
Historical Background
Achieving these reforms requires an understanding of African countries' histories.
Current African culture, politics, and civil-military relations have been greatly influenced by wide-spread colonization of much of the African continent.
The current problems in sub-Saharan Africa include political instability, economic collapse, diverse social and cultural differences, and lack of civilian control of the military. All these problems have evolved from colonization of African states by their
European masters, whose primary interest was to benefit from exploitation of Africa's natural resources. During the "Scramble for Africa," European powers claimed large parcels of land on the African continent for strategic purposes. Their avaricious competition for African resources led to the famous Berlin Conference of 1884-85.
Participants in the Berlin Conference sought to formalize the division of the continent into European colonies to avoid conflicts among the European powers in Africa. They displayed no concern for indigenous Africans, as recorded by Herbert Howe. 3 The boundaries were established simply by drawing lines upon a map or by following natural landmarks like rivers. European colonizers showed no regard for the fact that their arbitrary boundaries often split African ethnic groups. 4 The colonial powers' partitioning of Africa still impacts global affairs and contributes significantly to the turmoil of Africa's post-colonial states and regions. were unwilling to yield the economic and strategic importance of their colonial sources of energy, markets, and raw materials. 6 In some colonies, African desire for self-rule erupted into violent insurgencies against colonial rulers. However, white supremacists used their military forces and superior technology to quell these African rebels.
African natives were not provided with any knowledge or skills in preparation for self-rule by their colonial masters. As a result, most African post-colonial countries lacked the basic foundations of governance. Newly liberated Africans knew little about the administration of a state. However, they had been exposed to the imperialists' military affairs because natives were recruited into the colonial militaries to provide security for their white masters. Of course, the officer corps of all African colonies was monopolized by Europeans until after independence. "The ideal colonial soldier was supposed to be illiterate, uncontaminated by mission education, from remote areas, physically tough and politically unsophisticated." 7 They could fight, but they were preferred to do little else.
The failure of the colonial powers to develop self-governance systems and to build political identities of the colonies contributed to the post-colonial ungovernable situations and corrupt practices in the new independent states. They had no preparation to succeed politically or economically. This lack of statecraft caused dissatisfaction among the African populace, which had high expectations of their new governments.
Despite all the natural resources which could have provided economic prosperity and stability, African states continued to squander these opportunities through their corrupt practices and continuing economic dependence on the colonial nations. concern. This type of recruitment was also prevalent during colonialism; colonial authorities then deliberately recruited from indigenous minority tribes which were normally based in the rural areas, rather than enlisting urban elites and politicized people. 12 Militarization of selected ethnic groups eventually haunted post-colonial Africa;
it contributed to mass atrocities in some states. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, the worst of its kind in the region, has been attributed to Hutu fears of Tutsi dominance. But political chaos, economic disruption, and a colonial legacy that disrupted pre-colonial ethnic relations were also contributing factors. Leaders of these new states are seeking ways for their militaries to contribute positively to stability and democratic norms. Despite this positive approach, African states still lack the knowledge and capacity to achieve their desires. Several sub-Saharan militaries have been associated with the ruling parties ever since the liberation struggle; they have never experienced a change of government. It remains to be seen whether they will suffer the same fate as Zimbabwe, where the military supported a despot, not the country as a whole.
After enjoying self-governance for some time, many African countries are now starting to experience demands for change. Leaders of these countries are rejecting requests for the establishment of oversight committees to maintain checks and balances and to assume transparency. Some countries still deny the media the freedom to perform their reporting tasks. These leaders fear that the press will divulge their corrupt and unprofessional practices in their cultures of impunity. In certain cases, the role of the police is not well defined, so the military assumes responsibility for domestic security. Ethnic dominance by some groups in certain countries has often resulted in ethnic conflicts, like those in Rwanda and in Zimbabwe.
SSR programs have been designed to assist countries in building long-lasting peace and to help prevent further violent conflicts. SSR programs seek to reduce the militaries' roles in African countries and to build more professional militaries that accept civilian leadership. The SSR program is best suited for states like Zimbabwe, which has just experienced political turmoil and is currently governed by a coalition government trying to instill order and stability to the country. Its problems go beyond its civil-military relations; these problems extend to troubled sub-sectors such as intelligence, police, the judicial system, pervasive corruption, and human rights issues. 18 Judging by the output, investment in professional military training seems to provide a good return on defense spending by African countries. 37 Just as the military must protect the polity from the enemies, civilian leaders must also let the military conduct its own affairs so it does not destroy the society it is intended to protect. Civil authorities should not rely on the military only to address external threats. Capacity building requires more than building a professional military. It involves transferring technical knowledge and skills to individuals and institutions; it also involves crafting effective policies and effective administration of public services across the economic, social, political, and security realms. 40 Building capacity in sub-Saharan
African countries is more sustainable because it involves reforming existing structures rather than starting from nothing. Building capacity requires adequate resources; some funds must be used for projects like rehabilitating infrastructure to produce quick and visible results. It is therefore advisable for countries to seek assistance from regional and international organizations and nations who have the capacity to administer reconstruction and stability programs. These international actors can help manage crucial state functions until they are ready for host governments' ownership. 47 The U.S. should continue to sponsor this program, as it is one of the few in which civilians and their military counterparts dialogue together and share professional experiences. African states should strive to develop democratic governance, to foster military professionalism, and to strengthen regional organizations that will assist in curbing conflicts. With the assistance of programs cited in this study, African countries can build their own security programs, pursue their own interests, create democratic institutions, and embrace the rule of law. Reforming civil-military relations is the first step for achieving peaceful and stable democracies in sub Saharan Africa. "As democratic institutions sink firm roots and popular commitment to the constitutional system deepens, the scope for the military to intervene in politics or even to rattle its sabers menacingly diminishes." 48 
